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INTRODUCTION 
As the Weimar Republic deteriorated and Adolf Hitler rose in popularity, individual church 
leaders, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, began to worry. Others, like Martin Niemoller, rejoiced at first, 
thinking that Hitler could restore Germany to its former glory, but changed their opinions and 
denounced Hitler's government when the Nazis attacked the churches. What motivated those two 
men and others to stand up for what they believed, and what obstacles did they overcome in order 
to be heard? To fully understand their story and the story of the Confessional Church in Nazi 
Germany, it is necessary to look at some of the history of Germany. 
After Germany had to accept defeat in World War I and sign the Versailles Treaty, including 
provisions that declared Germany responsible for beginning the war, the political situation was 
unstable. The Weimar Republic, which officially began on November 9, 1918, was based on a 
new constitution which confirmed Germany's transition from monarchy to democracy. This 
. 
fledgling democracy had to deal with the consequences of a lost war--the reparation payments, the 
loss in prestige and a reduced army that was virtually incapacitated (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 30-31 ). 
The economic situation was difficult after the war; with massive unemployment and industrial 
dislocation, causing Germany to default on its reparation payments. The French occupation of the 
industrial Rhineland in 1923, began to exact reparations, caused the economy to collapse 
completely, with inflation robbing people of their savings and causing hardship for many. The 
situation did not improve much until 1925-1929 when, for a brief period, it finally seemed as iflife 
was returning to normal. But this trend was short lived as the Great Depression hit Germany with 
tremendous force in 1930. As hundreds of thousands of Germans lost their jobs and there was no 
hope to be found anywhere, the people grew desperate (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 31-33). 
During this time AdolfHitler, an Austrian born in 1889, had actively sought to gain political 
control. In 1923 he launched an uprising to take charge of the Bavarian state government in 
Southern Germany with hopes of marching on Berlin, but his revolution failed. His prison 
sentence convinced him to pursue legal avenues to power. His message in the later 1920s and 
early 1930s was that Germany could be revived stronger than ever, and that the Treaty of 
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Versailles was an immoral document. When elections were held in 1932, Hitler's party became the 
largest in the Reichstag, but still lacked a majority. Less than one year later, in January 1933, 
Hitler was appointed chancellor. From this position, he manipulated the Reichstag to gain a 
majority for his and other rightwing parties (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33). 
After February 27, 193 3, the Reich stag building in Berlin burned. Goring, the Prussian 
Minister of the Interior, blamed the German communist party for hiring a Dutchman, Marinus van 
der Lubbe, to commit arson, and ordered the arrests of many Jews and communists in conjuction 
with the fire (Chronik 1933 2). Although Hitler's party was not responsible for the incident, Hitler 
pressured President von Hindenburg to bypass Parliament and "sign a decree [. . . ] that suspended 
individual liberties" (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33). By using illegal means, Hitler finally reached a 
two-thirds majority, allowing him to amend the constitution, transferring all legislative power to 
himself and proclaiming the NSDAP the only legal party in the country by July 1933. When 
. 
President von Hindenburg died on August 2, 1934, Hitler proclaimed himselfPresident and 
Chancellor, calling himself Der Fuhrer. Free from the slow-moving processes of a democracy, 
Hitler moved ahead to improve the country. The economy which had begun to pick up 
momentum in 1932 continued to strengthen under his leadership, restoring the Germans' faith in 
themselves and in their country, even though he stabilized the economy through primarily 
inflationary means. He improved the infrastructure nationwide, renewed conscription and, most 
importantly, marched his troops into the French occupied Ruhr area and took it away from them, 
thus obliterating the Treaty of Versailles and erasing the humiliation suffered over a decade earlier 
(Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 33-34, 17). 
The situation of the German Church was just as troubling as the political and economic 
situation during the Weimar Republic--with one exception. After the war, small theological 
brotherhoods formed throughout Germany. Their membership consisted predominantly of pastors 
and theologians whose main purpose was prayer, meditation, scholarly work and exchange of 
ideas (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 8). Their theology was based on Christ, unlike the 
dominant theology in Germany characterized by liberal thinking and higher criticism. 
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Representative of the latter kind of thinking was Ludwig Feuerbach, a theologian who argued that 
"man is God" (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 29). Elevating man and oppressing God's unique character 
and holiness became the tenor of the day. The Church was furthermore very fragmented. 
Although many had dreamed of unifying the Church since 1848, it had never been achieved, and 
the Church in its structure was allowed to stand unchanged for over a century. There was little 
cooperation beyond the regional level. The twenty-eight Landeskirchen (regional Protestant 
churches) were only loosely connected with each other or the rest of the churches (Stegmann, Der 
Kirchenkampf in_der Thiiringer Evangelischen Kirche 19 33-1945 17). Influenced by Hegelian 
philosophy that denied the deity of Christ and rejected the Old Testament because of its Jewish 
context, and influenced by Nietzsche who had said God was dead, the German Church was weak 
and unprepared for the battle it had to fight (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 26-44). Had there been a 
stronger, Christ-centered theology, as well as a stronger open dialogue between the churches, the 
. 
German Church would have been better equipped to face the challenging times ahead. 
For some Landeskirchen, the struggle began earlier than for others, when church elections in 
1932 saw major Nazi involvement. Not only did the Nazi leadership encourage people to 
nominate members of the National Socialists, "but also to approve of those suggestions only if it 
could be guaranteed that after the elections two thirds of those voted into clerical positions would 
be Nazis" (y/. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 26). The objective of the 
Nazis was to eradicate those liberal tendencies that had led to pacifism and a global Christian 
worldview. Those people who accepted these beliefs and joined the Nazi supported churches 
were known as Deutsche Christen and will be referred to from here on as German Christians--a 
term that was coined by Hitler himself (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden 
Kirche 26-27). Doris Bergen would probably consider Niemoller's definition of the German 
Christians as too simple. She points out in her book Twisted Cross that die-hard Nazis like 
"Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler, as well as Adolf Hitler himself, considered Nazism and 
Christianity irreconcilable antagonists " (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 1 ). Furthermore, she points 
out that the German Christians were neither a unified front nor well-liked by the National 
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Socialists (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 2, 7). Bergen agrees though that the German Christians 
were the "main rival" (Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross 12) of the Confessional Church. 
THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1933 
Whereas trouble, caused by the Nazi takeover, in 1932 was still limited, the year 1933 
marked the beginning of serious problems for Germany in general and the Church in particular. 
After becoming Chancellor at the end of January, Hitler moved fast to consolidate his power. In 
March he issued new decrees, which effectively neutralized democracy in Germany, curtailing 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He also legalized the confiscations of property and 
house searches, and, in addition, prohibited people from meeting freely (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 
46). The Ermiichtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act) gave Hitler and his party unlimited powers and the 
first "brutal attacks" against communists, Jews, union members and Social Democrats followed 
. 
(Stegmann, Der Kirchenkampfin der Thiiringer Evangelischen Kirche 1933-1945 14). In April 
an appeal went to the people to boycott Jewish stores, and the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des 
Berufsbeamtentums--an anti-Jewish law to restore civil service with tenure that forced Jews to 
resign from positions in the civil service (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 47)--was implemented. In late 
July Hitler reached a concordat, an agreement between the Pope and the German government for 
the regulation of church affairs with the Vatican (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 130), legitimizing his rule. 
The changes in the political realm affected the church tremendously. Although Protestants 
and Catholics alike tried to address government issues, both groups fought separate battles. On 
March 23, 193 3, Hitler had promised during a speech in Parliament that "the national government 
sees both of the Christian confessions as the most important factors for the preservation of our 
national traditions" and that "the rights of the churches would not be reduced, [and that] their 
positions toward the nation would not be changed" (yv. Niemoller, Kirchenkampfim Dritten 
Reich 4). 
Even though Hitler's words sounded hopeful, one man had already begun to question the 
integrity of the new politcal leader. Dietrich Bonhoeffer questioned the motives of the 
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government as soon as the Aryan-paragraph, which called for a boycott of Jewish businesses, had 
been published on April 7. Going beyond addressing the new directive as it applied to the church, 
he questioned it as it applied to the state as well. He wrote an essay, entitled "Die Kirche vor der 
Judenfrage," (The Church and the Jewish Question) in which he not only discussed "the question 
of church membership of Jews, but also their human rights in the German state" (Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer 47). He was about the only one to address both issues, since the Confessional Church 
later only addressed the former and not the latter issue (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 47). Bonhoeffer 
always hoped to get the churches to begin acting and doing something, but few leaders were ready 
to challenge Hitler. When a new church constitution was passed on July 14, 1933, it seemed to 
validate Hitler's speech from March 23 . It began with the words, "The inviolable basis of the 
German evangelical church is the Gospel of Jesus Christ ... " (W. Niemoller, Kirchenkampf im 
Dritten Reich 4). Unfortunately, events had already taken place that gave those words a hollow 
. 
nng. 
Toward the end of May, Pastor Friedrich von Bodelschwingh was appointed Reichsbishop. 
He was well-known as a man of God who had followed in his father's footsteps as a pastor and as 
the leader of an institution for disabled people, especially epileptics. Von Bodelschwingh accepted 
his new position quite aware of the difficult task ahead of him in trying to reform and unify the 
Protestant Church on a national level. Upon taking office, he received letters of support from 
individuals as well as groups; however, the Nazis were not willing to accept his leadership. Their 
candidate for that position had been Ludwig Muller, a confidant of Hitler in church affairs. To 
ensure that Muller would become Reichsbishop, they fanned the flame of controversy in the 
churches and in public, using government control of newpapers to publish pro-Muller articles. An 
article in the So/diner Tagesblatt (June lOth, 1933), for example, showed clearly how political one 
particular church had become, with references to groups within the NSDAP and the SA protesting 
against v. Bodelschwingh and supporting Muller (HA 2/39-5). 
In addition to the continual bad publicity and controversy, people who had previously pledged 
their support to v. Bodelschwingh began withdrawing that support in light of the negative impact 
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the whole affair had on the unity of the churches. One pastor wrote to the Reichsbishop asking 
him to resign his position since "[Muller] is an old national socialist and has the absolute trust of 
AdolfHitler" (HA 2/39-5, letter dated Tubingen, 8. June 1933). Another pastor expressed his 
hope that "the national socialistic movement should be won for the church, but that that could only 
work when they [the German Christians] could elect the Reichsbishop from among their own 
group, or if Hitler would show a vote of confidence [for v. Bodelschwingh]." The same pastor 
continued asking v. Bodelschwingh to contact Hitler and ask for his help, or to suggest Muller for 
the office himself (HA 2/39-5). 
The Nazis continued their attempts to unseat v. Bodelschwingh by forcing influential church 
officials who supported the new Reichsbishop into silence. It is questionable what would have 
happened had v. Bodelschwingh stayed in office. His views were moderate and attracted many 
Germans who saw no fault with his ideas, but who also saw no fault with Hitler's ideas either. On 
. 
one hand, this could have resulted in a larger grassroots movement unlike the Confessional Church 
which later emerged. On the other hand, it could have resulted in a large organization with weak, 
watered down theology for the Protestant Church. In any case, v. Bodelschwingh resigned in June 
when the General Superintendent in Prussia was removed from his office, the President of the 
Kirche der Altpreussischen Union (Church of the Old Prussian Union) resigned (W. Niemoller, 
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 4 7), and when the appointment of Staatskommissar 
(State Commissioner) August Jager caused a major collapse of his support. Jager's appointment 
to office proved especially detrimental. According to Wihelm Niemoller, "Jager proceeded 
immediately to dissolve church representations and to appoint [Nazi] authorized representatives" 
(Kirchenkampf im Dritten Reich 5). To understand properly the impact of Jager's appointment, a 
look at one of his written circular letters to the chief administrators and police presidents in 
Prussia will suffice. He justified the intervention of the state into operations of the churches by 
stating that "intervention was necessary because the confusing situation was about to threaten the 
nation's unity which Adolf Hitler had created" (HA2/39-44). Jager continued: 
... the state--in its own interest--cannot tolerate resistance of either church or nation, that 
such attempt at resistance is rather to be viewed as treason against the nation and the 
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state, [and that he therefore] requests that [they, the chief administrators and police 
presidents] pay particular attention that his orders as well as those of his official 
representatives will not be sabotaged. Such an attempt would have to be considered 
revolt and rebellion against the state's authority which had to be suppressed immediately. 
[ ... ] It is for example not allowed that protests are published in local church bulletins, or 
that clerics are told [as had happened with their previous leadership] to voice protests in 
form of requests for prayers for the opressed church. (HA 2/3 9-44) 
When Jager's appointment was discussed among Niemoller and his colleagues, Bonhoeffer 
suggested they refuse performing burials for as long as Jager remained in office. However nobody 
thought such a strategy could be effective, and therefore it was not tried (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 
48). 
Within weeks after v. Bodelschwingh's resignation and Jager's appointment, nationwide 
church elections were held in late July, and the German Christians received approximately 75% of 
all the votes. However, Muller did not become Reichsbishop until late September (E. Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer 131) because of his association with a radical pastor named Joachim Hossenfelder 
whose extreme views irritated many Christians (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der 
Bekennenden Kirche 27). This forced leaders at the highest level of the German Christians to 
separate Muller from Hossenfelder's extreme views of the Church. But the rifts within the 
churches were already open and deepening. Pastors and church associations protested against 
being dissolved and demanded cooperation with v. Bodelschwingh. In order to heal those rifts, v. 
Bodelschwingh had stepped down, but the damage was done--not only among those churches who 
opposed the German Christians, but also among the German Christians themselves. Their 
supposed united movement split into different groups in varying in degrees of extremism (yv. 
Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 47). 
The results of the elections caused mixed reactions among the German Christians, but 
especially among those opposed to the Nazi-supported church. One of the results was that the 
Jungreformatoren (Young Reformers) "withdrew from church politics" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 
131). Some people considered this group as a precursor to the Bekennende Kirche (Confessional 
Church). 
According to Wilhelm Niemoller, the Jungreformatoren was a group of people that had 
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gathered all those around them who opposed the German Christians. However, this group lacked 
theological soundness and determination to reject the new theology and the Fuhrer idea. 
Martin Niemoller, head of administration for the Jungrejormatoren at the time, composed sixteen 
theses which he read on August 2, during a meeting of the Jungreformatoren questioning the 
validity of the July elections (yr/. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 11 ). When the Prussian 
General Synod, dominated by the German Christians, changed statutes within the church without 
allowing the minority groups to voice their opinions, Martin Niemoller sent a letter to 
approximately three thousand pastors, almost all of them members of the Jungreformatoren. In his 
letter Niemoller addressed the issues raised by the synod and announced the establishment of an 
organization to help pastors stay true to the authority of scripture and Jesus Christ alone. Another 
result of the synod was that six general-superintendents were forced into retirement in Old Prussia, 
which caused tremendous confusion and tension among the churches in that part of the state (yr/ . 
. 
Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 2-3). 
When the German Christians held their synod, known as the Brown Synod, on September 5, 
1933, it became obvious that those opposing them needed to unite more than ever before. During 
this particular synod the legal status of clerics was redefined. It was argued that only a man who 
was completely committed to the German Evangelical Church (with the German Christian style 
theology) and to the German nation could be called to become a pastor or priest. This same 
change in legal status called for those pastors who were non-Aryan--clerics and civil servants who 
were either non-Aryans themselves or married to a non-Aryan to be fired (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 12-13). 
One day after the synod, Martin Niemoller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer worked on a statement 
regarding the Aryan-paragraph. On September 11, sixty pastors signed what became known as 
the Berliner Siitze (Berlin Statements). The statements consisted of the Niemoller and 
Bonhoeffer's statement and the Rheinisch-Westfiilischen Siitzen (Rhine-Westphalian Statements) 
which had been developed by two different brotherhoods (yr/. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 
15). As already mentioned the brotherhoods were formed after World War I by pastors and 
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theologians who devoted themselves to prayer, meditation, scholarly work and exchange of ideas. 
Over the course of the summer, while the v. Bodelschwingh controversy raged in the 
spotlight, brotherhoods in the regions of the Rhineland and Westphalia worked steadily in 
developing their theology. Thousands of copies of the Berliner Satze were sent to pastors as 
early as September 12. On September 15, Martin Niemoller travelled to Bethel near Bielefeld to 
win Pastor v. Bodelschwingh's support for a new organization called the Pfarrernotbund (Pastors' 
Emergency Association, which some seas the nucleus of the Confessional Church. Although v. 
Bodelschwingh welcomed the new organization he refused to accept the leadership position (W. 
Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 15-17). 
Von Bodelschwingh was not the only one of the older generation in the church leadership who 
refused to join the new association. After v. Bodelschwingh's refusal, Martin Niemoller 
approached the Bishop of Hanover, Dr. August Marahrens, to offer him the leadership position, 
. 
but Marahrens refused as well. Aware of what was at stake and realizing that leadership was 
needed immediately, Martin Niemoller, then forty-one years old, finally agreed to accept the 
responsibility of the leadership position. On September 19, Martin Niemoller asked pastors again 
to join the new association (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 16-18). By 1938 the 
Pastors Emergency Association would count 4,952 members, just over 20% of the number of 
active pastors (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund, Preface). 
On October 20, seven men, including Martin Niemoller, were chosen as members of the 
Bruderrat (Council ofBrothers), with the authority to determine the association's general course 
of action as well as the authority to represent the group officially. An eighth member was 
added in early November. The Bruderrat shared equally in decision making, and Niemoller's vote 
did not bear any more weight than any one of the others. One of the reasons for their joint 
decision making was not only accountability, but also the desire to avoid the Fuhrer principle 
which held Germany in its relentless grip (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 20-21). 
Contact among the pastors in the association was kept by circular letters, which began on 
November 2, 1933, and ended on February 9, 1935. In the early letters, Martin Niemoller 
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requested input from pastors to help formulate a unified creed or profession of faith that would 
serve as guideline for pastors and ultimately would have the same weight as a pastor's ordination 
vows. Although one of the first versions was already developed in November of 1933, it would 
not be until after the Barmen Synod in 1934 that a version was agreed upon. Once the unified 
version was accepted, the Rote Karte (red card), as it became known, would be signed not only by 
pastors, but also by individual members of the congregations f'N. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 
22-27). The beginning ofthe Confessional Church is somewhat obscure, although it was 
intimately connected to the person of Martin Niemoller. Since it would not be until the Synod of 
Barmen that the groups working together would officially refer to themselves as the Confessional 
Church, this paper follows further events surrounding NiemoiJer's organization. 
The Pastors' Emergency Association's membership rose to over seven thousand members 
within the first four months of its existence. Unfortunately, that number dropped steadily due to 
. 
an inability of the different Protestant confessions to work persistently and productively together. 
Church politics only added to the difficulties rather than helped solve them (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 31 ). On September 27, the German Christians held their national synod at the 
town of Wittenberg during which Ludwig Muller was to be elected as Reichsbishop. Twenty-two 
men, among them Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Niemoller and Friedrich Muller, planned to voice 
their opinions. The latter, on behalf of two thousand pastors, wrote a statement addressed to the 
national synod. The document criticized the new regulations, the paganizing of the Gospel and the 
Aryan-paragraph among others. "None of the present church representatives felt courageous 
enough to read the statement aloud, therefore Fritz Muller and his friends nailed copies of the 
statement to trees and church doors" f'N. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 32). Almost a month 
later, on November 11 , three members of the Pastors' Emergency Association, including Martin 
Niemoller, were suspended until further notice by the Berliner Konsistorium. It would take five 
days before the three men could again continue their work in an offical capacity f'N. Niemoller, 
Der Pfarrernotbund 35). 
A long-planned event took place in the Sportpalast (a sports arena) in Berlin on Novemberl3. 
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The German Christians held a meeting for all the members demanding continued changes within 
the church and its theology. Among other things, they insisted on rejecting the Old Testament, 
judging it inferior in quality and morality to the New Testament, and refused Pauline theology 
regarding the sinfulness of mankind (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 38-39). Furthermore the 
German Christians demanded that the anti-Jewish laws, issued in April, should be enforced 
everywhere in the country (Chronik 1933 7). 
Martin Niemoller reacted to the German Christians' demands in a letter to the Pastors' 
Emergency Association informing the ministers of the content of the meeting in Berlin and asking 
them to read a statement to their churches on November 19 at church services. Three ofthe 
pastors who complied with Niemoller's request were suspended. Their names were listed in 
another ofNiemoller's circular letters with the request for intercessory prayer for these three 
pastors by name. This type of intercession would become the distinguishing mark of the Pastors' 
. 
Emergency Association and later of the Confessional Church. It would be a mark of distinction 
that the Nazis would severely punish wherever they found it (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 
42-43). Despite additional repeated meetings between members of the Pastors' Emergency 
Association with Reichsbishop Miiller and Secretary of Church Affairs Weber nothing essentially 
changed, until finally on December 21 , Joachim Hossenfelder resigned temporarily from his offical 
duties within the German Christian Church (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 39-42). 
Even though the German Christians tried to retain control with the help of the police who 
prohibited meetings and the distribution ofleaflets, the month ofDecember did not go well for 
them. On December 2, Muller introduced a new clerical department. The next day he was forced 
to cancel the festivities that should have accompanied his official acceptance of his new position as 
Reichsbishop. Over the next four weeks, he was dealt repeated blows as all four members of the 
new clerical department resigned their positions. Technically the church was again without 
legitimate leadership, but Muller remained in office. By mid-December he was not only facing 
opposition from the Pastors' Emergency Association, but also from those Lutheran bishops who 
were not German Christians, and who informed him on December 19 that in order to preserve the 
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unity of the German Evangelical Church, they could no longer consider his orders as 
authoritatively binding. One day later he received a letter from the Pastors' Emergency 
Association, now with a membership of six thousand pastors, expressing that its members no 
longer placed any confidence in the Reichsbishop's abilities to bring peace to the German 
Evangelical Church unless the clerical department's crisis could be resolved by December 23, and 
the problems within the church could be dealt with in a truly Christian manner (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 43-46). By the end of 1933, the lines between the German Christians and the 
Confessional Church were drawn. Nobody on either side expected a quick or easy end to the 
conflict. 
THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1934 
The year 1934 began with a clear attempt by Reichsbishop Muller to silence any opposition to 
. 
the German Christians, clearly revoking his action of the last month, when he was forced, on 
December 6, to publicly withdraw his support from them. His "decree regarding the 
reestablishment of order in the German Evangelical Church" was later referred to as "muzzling 
order" since it was a clear attempt to silence the pastors (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 47). 
Muller defended his decision with the statement that the rifts within the church endangered 
national unity as well as the spread of the Gospel. A closer look at the decree revealed though 
that its main focus was to silence organized opposition in the churches. Church services were now 
for preaching only. Church officials including deacons and pastors were neither allowed to 
become involved in church politics by passing out printed material nor to use church facilities for 
any type of meetings related to church politics. Violators would be penalized with immediate 
temporary suspension and salary cuts of at least one third. Finally, violators would be formally 
charged with legal infractions and, once judged guilty, would be permanently removed from their 
positions (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 47-48). It is obvious that the "muzzling order" was 
very effective in hindering pastors to connect with each other and their congregations regarding 
the situation of the church in general. 
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Martin Niemoller reacted immediately and wrote a statement which he passed on to the 
Association. Difficulties with the postal service resulted in a delay; as a result, many pastors read 
the statement in their churches on January 14 instead ofJanuary 7. One particular detail is worth 
mentioning. According to Niemoller, a meeting had taken place in Halle between several leaders 
of Landeskirchen on January 4 . Those leaders who did not belong to the German Christians had 
come together to discuss how they could compel the Reichsbishop to keep promises he had made 
in previous weeks. Muller led the participants of the meeting to believe that a decision would be 
made soon. This message caused them to forgo any action until they heard from him again. On 
the same day he published his "muzzling order" (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 49-50). 
Muller obviously played his cards well. By appealing to the undecided leaders in the 
Protestant church for patience, he silenced them effectively long enough to push through his 
agenda. With the sam~ strike he not only silenced temporarily the leaders, but also those people 
the leaders represented, causing an attitude of cautious waiting. Persecution increased in mid-
January, but thousands of pastors had read the statement. Although not all of them could be 
suspended and tried, many pastors everywhere were indeed dealt with in that manner (W. 
Niemoller, Dr Pjarrernotbund 50-51). 
The Pastors' Emergency Association was increasingly monitored for political activity by the 
Gestapo. Officials in the government hoped that Niemoller and his friends would lose support 
among the population and tried to defame them and their organization. One of the reasons the 
government was interested in the group's supposed political activity was an upcoming meeting 
with Hitler and prominent leaders of the church. Naturally the Secret Police were most interested 
in information that could be distorted to the government's advantage (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pjarrernotbund 51-53). As it turned out later, tapping phone lines of members ofthe Pastors' 
Emergency Association, especially of Martin Niemoller, was also ordered (W. Niemoller, Kampf 
und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 88). 
Herman Goring, "Prussian Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Police and 
Gestapo" (Goring, Hermann 1), used part of the gathered information to "set up a stage worthy 
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performance," at least according to Wilhelm Niemoller, who called the meeting with Hitler a 
disaster for the Confessional Church (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 53). In his book, 
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche, NiemoUer gives more particulars about the incident. 
Several men representing different groups attended the meeting. Hitler, GOring, and the Minister 
for the Interior, Frick, represented the government. Several German Christian bishops of the 
Landeskirchen~ several Reichsleiter, and finally members of what was still growing into the 
Confessional Church were the other participants. The latter group included, among others, state 
bishop Marahrens who, as already mentioned, had refused to lead the Pastors' Emergency 
Association, state bishop Theophil Wurm, and Martin Niemoller (W. NiemoUer, Kampf und 
Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 88). 
When NiemoUer addressed Hitler, he pointed out that he was solely interested in "'the welfare 
of the church, the state, and the German people"' (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 130). Hitler's comment 
. 
to Niemoller's statement was "'You confine yourself to the Church. I'll take care of the German 
people"' (Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 131 ). Niemoller addressed Hitler one more time when taking 
leave saying: '"You said that 'I will take care of the German people.' But we too, as Christians and 
churchmen, have a responsibility toward the German people. That responsibility was entrusted to 
us by God, and neither you nor anyone in this world has the power to take it from us"' (Lutzer, 
Hitler's Cross 131 ). This last comment obviously did not please Hitler at all and as a result 
Niemoller was repeatedly interrogated by Secret Police agents during the next few days, while 
Reichsbishop Muller began negotiations with the state bishops "promising them the appointment 
of a new clerical department, the separation of church and state, and to take a liberal approach 
toward interpreting the enforcement ofthe muzzling order" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis 
der Bekennenden Kirche 89). 
The result of that meeting came as a shock to Niemoller and the members of the Pastor 
Emergency Association. On October 27, it became public knowledge that those state bishops, 
who were neither active members of the German Christians nor members of the Pastors' 
Emergency Association, had crossed the lines and unanimously supported the Reichsbishop. The 
Klarhorst 15 
German Christians enjoyed their victory and did their utmost to use it to their advantage in the 
media (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 89). 
However, the German Christians had stretched the truth. The state bishops had only agreed 
to support the Reichsbishop, because they thought they could hold him to his promises, like the 
promise that the state bishops would be included more often in decision making and church 
politics. Unfortunately, they had only Moller's verbal promises, but nothing in writing (W. 
Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 55). The state bishops "' did not only declare their absolute 
loyalty to the Third Reich and its Fuhrer,"' but they also "'utterly condemned all active criticism of 
the state, nation ... "' (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 55). This move by the state bishops 
was very damaging indeed because it gave the public a negative impression of the Pastors' 
Emergency Association, seeing it more as a group of trouble-makers rather than as pastors 
fighting for the right to preach a pure, undiluted Gospel. 
. 
It appeared as if the month of January would end with a major victory for the German 
Christians and Reichsbishop MOller. On January 26, Muller in his function as Reichsbishop and as 
the Prussian state bishop, not only suspended Niemoller, but also issued a new decree intended to 
"secure the unified leadership of the evangelical church in the Prussian Union." By February 2, 
fifty pastors had been suspended based on violations of the "muzzling order." The secret police 
began infiltrating church services, arresting pastors, and according toW. Niemoller, this was the 
first time that pastors were sent to concentration camps. On February 3, MOller ordered that 
pastors could be reassigned to other churches without notice. Pastors were also denied the right 
to appeal those reassigments. Two days later, he disolved several high-ranking offices within the 
Protestant church hierarchy (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 89-91 ). 
While the German Christians and Reichsbishop Muller harrassed pastors, the Pastor 
Emergency Association faced a major crisis. Many blamed Niemoller for causing the final breach 
with Hitler. On January 29, the Council ofBrothers of the Pastors' Emergency Association met to 
discuss the situation when Niemoller was arrested for further interrogation. Despite the arrest, the 
meeting continued, and the council realized that they could not give up, no matter how dire the 
RlLEY-H!CKI~JGBOTHAM LIBRAf 
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future seemed. Another meeting held two days later included not only council members, but also 
local church representatives. They decided to draft letters to the renegade state bishops in which 
they reproached the bishops and to Reichsbishop Muller in which the council members expressed 
their intent to keep fighting for the right to preach the true Gospel (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 56-58). 
Even though the Council ofBrothers and the chosen representatives of the local churches saw 
the need to continue with their resistance, it became obvious that it would be harder to do than 
ever before. Many pastors removed themselves from the membership roll of the Pastors' 
Emergency Association. Some no longer considered Niemoller as an appropriate representative of 
their views, and others felt that they had to obey their state bishops and follow the lead those men 
had taken on January 27. The Pastors' Emergency Association's membership dropped from over 
seven thousand to just over five thousand (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 58). A newspaper 
. 
article dated February 1 0, announced the decision of the state bishops and hailed it as a triumph 
for the German Christians. Interestingly enough it misrepresented the facts when it stated that 
"the leaders of the Pastors' Emergency Association .. . renounce explicitly any further opposition 
against the Reichsbishop" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 60). The article does not mention 
that the state bishops were only allies and not the officially elected leaders of the Pastors' 
Emergency Association. 
Another event that had taken place on January 30 seemed to lend credibility to the 
newspaper's claim. The church leadership in the state of Wiirtemberg had followed an invitation 
of the political police and came to an agreement which included dissolving the Pastors' Emergency 
Association in that state, as well as giving up the right to critique any decisions regarding the 
restructuring of the German Evangelical Church. State Bishop Wurm had never officially been a 
member of the Pastors' Emergency Association; therefore, he had no right to agree to dissolving it 
in his state. Yet, that particular detail was never mentioned in public. The members of the 
association in Wiirtemberg were informed on February 2, that the "Pastors' Emergency 
Association dissolved itself on demand of the political police in order to avoid being dissolved; 
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however, the association had not given up on its desire to do theological work renewing the 
church in accord with the Gospel" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 65). The agreement did 
not become the victory the German Christians had claimed, even though it did do some damage. 
By March 13, State Bishop Wurm changed his opinion regarding the agreement (W. Niemoller, 
Der Pfarrernotbund 61-66). 
On March 17, Muller published the '"Good Friday Message"'which received a strong rebuke 
from the Westphalian Brotherhood. The brotherhood responded, on behalf of 500 Westphalian 
pastors, on April 5 with their message "Our word to the congregations," to the main points in 
Muller's attack (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 72). Muller had begun his message by calling 
"the pastors under the cross of Christ to examine themselves" (Unser Wort an die Gemeinden 2). 
The brotherhood condemned the fact that Muller chose the public media to spread his message, 
and that he made it sound as if the openness for dialogue was entirely on the Reichbischop's side . 
. 
Muller had asked for the Confessional Church to "'bring its tongue as a sacrifice to Christ's cross 
and to refrain from defaming the eighth commandment"' (Unser Wort an die Gemeinden 2). One 
ofMuller's accusations, which hurt members of the Confessional Church the deepest, had been 
that they "wanted to be holier than the Lord himself' (Unser Wort and die Gemeinden 2). Despite 
laying blame for the church struggle solely at the Confessional Church's door, "Muller had 
claimed to have been pressured to offer amnesty," according to the Westphalian Brotherhood, a 
fact which surprised the Confessional Church, which asked in response "why they who serve 
responsibly in the church should ask for amnesty" (HA 2/39-69, fax 2). Obviously Muller had 
also blamed the National Socialists for the confusion in the church, because the Westphalian 
Brotherhood pointed out that it was the German Christians who continually caused problems in 
the church and not the government. Muller had ordered the pastors to keep focused on their own 
congregations, an order the Westphalian Brotherhood refused on grounds that it was impossible to 
care for one's local congregation when methods of the church leadership advanced the decay of 
congregations and not their growth. Finally, Muller had argued that confessing Christ was not at 
the center of the controversy but the necessity for order, to which the Westphalian Brotherhood 
Klarhorst 18 
replied that confessing Christ was exactly what the church struggle was all about (Unser Wort an 
die Gemeinden 2-3). 
The rebuttal of the Westphalian Brotherhood, which helped refortify the position of the 
Pastors' Emergency Association (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 72), as well as the position of 
the Confessional Church, was not the only visible support the weary pastors and members of both 
organizations received. Unexpected support from the international church community encouraged 
the Pastor's Emergency Association. The link between the Association and the international 
community was predominantly Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In July of 1931 , Bonhoeffer had met Karl 
Barth, the Swiss theologian whose work he had first encountered in 1924 (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 
27, 34). In September of 1931, Bonhoeffer represented Germany during the "'World Alliance' 
conference in Cambridge," England where he was appointed as "one of three secretaries for 
ecumenical work amo?g the youth, responsible for mid and northern Europe" (E. Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer 35). In the course of working for the World Alliance he met "George Bell, the bishop 
of Chichester, [and] at that time president ofLife and Work," another international group devoted 
to ecumenical work (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 6). Both men became close friends in the following 
years, and World Alliance as well as Life and Work would later publicly support the Confessional 
Church (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 36). In March of 1934, Bell "wrote a letter to the publisher of the 
"'Times"' informing the British public of the problems in the German Protestant Church and that 
despite claims of the German government these problems had caused tension with the international 
evangelical community (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 75). A declaration of solidarity signed 
by 61 0 Swiss pastors and theologians helped boost the confidence ofNiemoUer and his friends 
encouraging them to continue in new ways to reach their goals (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 75). 
The man most associated with developing strategies to reach these goals was Karl Immer, a 
pastor in the city ofBarmen. He had encouraged members of the Pastors' Emergency Association 
to establish synods throughout the country. One of the more important major synods had already 
taken place in mid-February 1934 in Barmen (Rhineland). When the Council of Brothers of the 
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Pastors' Emergency Association heard a report of the meeting by one of its attendees, it requested 
to be accepted into the ranks of the synod. More synods followed, ultimately culminating in the 
Synod of Barmen, which met from May 29 to 31 (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 76-80). 
One more synod needs to be mentioned before turning the attention to Barmen. The Old Prussian 
Union, which was totally opposed to the German Christians, and which had been on the frontlines 
ever since the conflict had begun in the churches, held their synod on May 20, during which a 
proposal for the organization of the future Confessional Church was made (W. Niemoller, Kampf 
und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 123). It appears as if some aspects of the proposal were 
later incorporated in the developing structure of the Confessional Church. 
Nine days later "126 representatives of 18 Landeskirchen" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis 
der Bekennenden Kirche 123), met in Barmen where they were called to repent, to gather under 
the word of God, and f1IOSt importantly to remember "the glory and uniqueness, as well as the 
honor and the power of God's word" (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
123). The synod concluded with several decisions and statements. First, the attendees decided to 
establish a Council of Brothers representing all groups present including Lutherans and the 
Reformed Church. Some names of the chosen members ofthe Council ofBrothers were familiar: 
Martin Niemoller, Hans Asmussen, Karl Immer, and Gerhard Jacobi, among others. Second, the 
synod categorically rejected Reichsbishop MOller and his colleagues declaring: 
We deny that the current clerical regime of the German Evangelical Church has any legal 
authority to reform the [church] constitution. Instead, we demand explicitly that it honors 
the existing constitution. We declare that as long as the current clerical regime exists, we, 
the Confessional Church, will fundamentally refuse any negotiations of questions 
regarding the constitution. (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
123) 
In order to justify such a claim, a lawyer, Dr. Eberhard Fiedler, gave a lecture entitled an 
"Explanation regarding the legal status of the confessional synod of the German Evangelical 
Church." Fiedler pointed out just why the current church leadership had no right to be in a 
leadership position (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 123). 
Even though clarification of the legal status was important, there was something more 
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important that happened in Barmen. The third statement was the theological declaration of 
Barmen which consisted of six basic tenets developed by Karl Barth. The first tenet affirmed, 
based on scripture, that Jesus Christ is the only revelation of God. The second tenet pointed to 
Jesus Christ as the only means of salvation and that there are no areas in a person's life that are 
excepted from the need of sanctification. The third tenet affirmed the role of the church in society 
and that its center should be Jesus Christ alone. The fourth tenet denied special powers to church 
leaders. The fifth tenet rejected the idea that the roles of church and state could be interchanged. 
And finally, the sixth tenet affirmed that the Gospel should spread freely and that God cannot be 
forced to act according to the will ofhuman beings (EKD: Glaube aktuelli-3). It can be argued 
that the Barmen declaration was very important to the development of the Confessionial Church. 
In future years it would act like a plumb line against which other declarations, ideas and 
phiJosopies would be measured. Wilhelm Niemoller quotes Professor D. Arthur Cochrane of 
. 
Dubuque, "'It is my firm conviction that the Barmen Declaration is the most significant Church 
document that has appeared since Reformation Confessions and Catechismus of the 16th and 17th 
centuries ... here speaks the voice of one, holy ecumenical church transcending national, racial 
and denominational barriers!111 (Westfalische Kirche im Kampj 32). Unfortunately, the unity that 
Cochrane praises so highly would not last long. 
The unity which signified the official birth of the Confessional Church is attributed to Pastor 
Hans Asmussen who introduced the theological declaration to the synod without political 
innuendo. No matter where the attendees stood regarding politics, Asmussen made sure that the 
declaration and its implications were understood within only theological parameters. Barth and 
Bonhoeffer would distance themselves from this non-political attitude later. According to Bethge, 
it is the main reason why Bonhoeffer would eventually choose to become involved in an 
unsuccessful conspiracy to stop Hitler (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 53). There were a few who 
considered their denominational differences too great to be reconciled and chose to disagree with 
the union of the denominations, but they were not numerous enough to threaten the sense of unity 
among the participants of the synod (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
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126). 
Many, unlike Barth and Bonhoeffer, were comfortable with the theological declaration, and "it 
did not take long before young theologians would use it as the basis of their commitment at the 
time of their ordination" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 127). A 
small group of Bavarian theologians tried to discredit the Barmen declaration, with an article 
published on June 11 . In their opinion the six tenets were not Lutheran enough. They confirmed 
in their article that Hitler was a pious, genuine Christian worthy of their support. The publication 
did not dampen the spirit of those who had attended Barmen, but the German Christians tried to 
make the most of it in the media (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
131). 
This minor attack was mild compared to what followed later. While the Confessional Church 
was growing, August Jager, who had already caused problems in Prussia as the state's 
. 
commissioner, had been appointed in April to more powerful offices extending his authority 
beyond Prussia's borders. His attempts to bring "peace and order" to the German Evangelical 
Church were ruthless and not at all peaceful (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 81). 
Only a couple of weeks later, another attack was launched against the Pastors' Emergency 
Association, which continued to exist as a separate entity, though it was also part of the 
Confessional Church. The State Bishop ofNassau-Hessen outlawed the organization in that state. 
Members from everywhere in the country supported the harrassed pastors in Nassau-Hessen with 
letters of encouragement and the attempt to ban the group failed . However, some of the pastors 
caved in under the pressure and withdrew their membership. Further attacks by the state bishop 
followed, but were not successful except in only a few individual cases (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 82-88). 
An additional widespread attack launched at the Landeskirchen was that almost all of them 
were "incorporated" (gleichgeschaltet) into one big group that was controlled by the German 
Christians. The attack began in early March and ended successfully in late July. Only the states of 
Wiirtemberg, Hanover, and Bavaria could avoid the Gleichschaltung, which centralized the 
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administration of all theLandeskirchen in the country. The Council ofBrothers ofthe 
Confessional Synod protested sharply, but without any success (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarremotbzmd 89). When the next synod met in Dahlem, on October 20, it became obvious that 
times had gotten harder than ever before. According to a report published during the synod, 1,043 
measures had been taken against pastors. These measures included disciplinary actions, 
suspensions, prohibition to preach, forced reassignments, forced retirement, suspension from 
higher clerical offices, reprimands, fines, and salary cuts among others (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarremotbund 90-91 ). 
The Pastors' Emergency Association kept a low profile during this time, according to a letter 
by Martin Niemoller. He pointed out in Circular Letter No. 17: 
... the Council ofBrothers in the individual confessional synods inform their members 
about the status quo and necessary tasks within the Confessional Church. The leadership 
of the Association is in close contact with the confessional synods. This practice proved 
sufficient and allowed the Association to concentrate on supporting members who had 
been disciplined. (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarremotbund 91) 
The Pastors' Emergency Association was fortunate that it had many friends among lawyers and 
court officials on local and state levels. With the help of these Christian men, the Association was 
able to help represent members in court successfully. Some of those men paid a heavy price. Dr. 
Hans Buttersack, a founding member of the Confessional Church in Nassau-Hessen who 
fought not only for the church, but who also represented Jews in court, was sent to the 
concentration camp in Dachau where he died. Dr. Hans Koch, who represented Martin Niemoller 
in court, was shot by the Secret Police without a valid court ruling (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 93-94). 
The problems for the Confessional Church did not end. "A state of emergency was declared 
for the church" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 131) by Reichsbishop MOller which gave him the right to 
interfere wherever he saw an emergency in the Landeskirchen (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis 
der Bekennenden Kirche 132). The participants of the Dahlem Synod, hosted by and exclusively 
attended by members of the Confessional Church, declared a state of emergency within the church 
itself based on the events during the last year and "the first article of the church constitution of 
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July 11 , 1933" (yl. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 132). They outlined 
a new form of church government which proved impossible to work because it included a 
"weakness" in the filing system of official documents which created a loophole between the 
church's and government's bureaucracies allowing the opposition to tum the interpretation of the 
article in question in either direction (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
184-187). 
On November 22 a provisional church leadership was established (W. Niemoller, Kampf und 
Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 191) which consisted of the Confessional Church and "the 
churches ofBavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover" (<i>Britannica.com<i> 1), and which "should 
seek support from the government and demand recognition of its authority and representation of 
the German Evangelical Church for only a limited period of time" (yl. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 95). ~t that time the German Christians were firmly in control of the 
government-favoring "German Evangelical Church, a federation formed in 1933 ofLutheran, 
Reformed, and United territorial churches" (<i>Britannica<i> 1). It is questionable how this new 
leadership tried to gain recognition from a political and clerical government that had proven so 
hostile in the past. Instead of furthering the cause for the unification of the church and solving 
differences, it added to the problems. 
One result of that decision of forming the new provisional leadership, consisting of members 
of the Confessional Church and representatives of the Landeskirchen of Bavaria, Hanover and 
Wurtemberg, was that Hermann Albert Hesse, Karl Immer, and Martin Niemoller resigned from 
the Reichsbruderrat (a newly founded council made up of six members of the council of the 
German Evangelical Church). That decision increased the difference between those around Martin 
Niemoller, the radical Dahlemites and the more moderate members of the Confessional Church. 
Now Niemoller, Hans Asmussen, Friedrich Muller were synonymous with the words "radical," 
"persevering," and "uncompromising" (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis d.er Bekennenden 
Kirche 189). The provisional leadership crumbled after just one year because of its inability to 
refrain from compromising the goals set during the Dahlem synod (W. Niemoller, Der 
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Pjarrernotbund 95). It is of interest to note that Dahlem was in that region of the country that 
was under the control of the Old Prussian Union which had been from the beginning a very strong 
fighter against the German Christians. One cannot help but wonder ifMartin Niemoller could 
have thrived and been able to be as radical if he had been in a region that was relatively weak in its 
fight against the new church government. 
As if the internal troubles within the Confessional Church were not enough, the government 
added a new measure to ensure more problems in the future for the Confessional Church and any 
organization or individual who did not agree with the current political leadership. When Hitler 
and his staff issued the Heimtuckegesetz (Treachery Law) on December 20, they effectively 
increased their control and power to silence people who were opposed to their leadership. The 
wording of the law was rather ambiguous and allowed for a wide range of interpretation. It 
basically meant that a person who made derogatory comments about the government and its 
. 
officials, as well as the NSDAP party itself and its associated organizations, could be either fined 
or sent to jail. If a person committed a crime wearing a uniform or ensignia of the NSDAP they 
could be punished with at least six months in prison. If the deed was committed with the intention 
of causing a riot, inducing fear in the population, or, even worse, giving the Third Reich negative 
international media attention, the individual could be sentenced to anywhere from three years to 
life in prison. Severe cases could result in the death penalty (Heimtuckegesetz 11/07/01). 
Personal opinions opposing the government were considered equal to treason against the state and 
the German nation, upsetting many pastors as their patriotism was questioned when they refused 
to support the Nazis. 
The end of 1934 brought good and bad news. Martin Niemoller was reinstated as pastor of 
his church in Berlin-Dahlem at the beginning ofDecember (W. Niemoller, Der Pjarrernotbund 
97), but Karl Barth, the main author of the Barmen Declaration, was suspended from his teaching 
position and forced into retirement, just like many other university professors before him. Barth 
returned to his native Switzerland trying to support the cause of the Confessional Church from the 
city of Basel (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 229-231 ). His help 
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would later result in controversy that did not really help the Confessional Church and would taint 
his contributions to the Barmen Declaration in the eyes of many. 
THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1935-38 
At the beginning of 1935, Martin Niemoller and members of the Pastors' Emergency 
Association still kept a low profile, using the time to regroup and rethink their position. It was 
decided that pastors who were associated with the Confessional Church had to join the Pastors' 
Emergency Association in order to be eligible for financial help by the association. In turn, 
members of the Pastors' Emergency Association were asked to do everything possible to further 
the cause of the Confessional Church in their local churches (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 
97). 
The situation arol!nd the Confessional Church became tense again in early March when the 
Old Prussian Union held their second synod in Dahlem. The participants' message was very direct. 
We see our nation (Volk) threatened by a deadly danger. The danger is a new religion. 
The church has the order of its Lord to watch that our nation (Volk) gives Christ the 
honor which is due him as the judge of the world. The church knows that it will be held 
accountable by God, if [the church] allowed the nation (Volk) to turn its back on Christ 
without warning. (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 98) 
This message was read by many pastors across the nation, despite the fact that those suspected or 
known to be members of the Pastors' Emergency Association were visited by the Gestapo to 
inform them that the message was not to be read in public. Seven hundred and fifteen pastors, 
including Martin Niemoller and Gerhard Jacobi, were arrested after disregarding the Gestapo's 
warning. The pastors in the Rhineland and Westphalia provinces decided to delay their reading of 
the message and therefore eluded the Gestapo. The most disconcerting fact about this incident in 
March 1935 was not so much the number of arrests, but rather the fact that the police and 
Gestapo and no longer the regional and national church authorities punished the pastors. 
Punishments for belligerent pastors were drastically increased and more severe than ever. Pastors 
were banned from speaking, ordered to leave their churches, arrested, or even deported to 
concentration camps. Because of their plight, churches nationwide began to hold special prayer 
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services for pastors and prayed for them by name (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 98-99). 
The Confessional Church did not limit its efforts to prayer alone. In late May representatives 
of regional churches met in Bad Oeynhausen to identify problems within the churches and to 
discuss strategies for solving those problems. The Confessional Church held their third synod at 
Augsburg from June 4-6. Since problems with the areas of responsibilities between the provisional 
church leadership and the Reichsbruderrat had been solved in mid-May, Martin Niemoller, Karl 
Immer and Hermann Albert Hesse had rejoined the council and were listed as three of the 120 
participants. Although the synod addressed issues like training new pastors and assignment of 
areas of responsibilities of the provisional church leadership and the Reichsbruderrat, it failed to 
address the measures the government had taken against the churches (W. Niemoller, Der 
Pfarrernotbund 100, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 233-235). It is questionable 
why the participants ayoided the topic of government persecution. Perhaps they considered the 
topics they did discuss as more under their control and probable to solve than the issue concerning 
the government. 
In July it became obvious for Martin Niemoller that the provisional church leadership was 
failing. Inviting more than 50 members of the Pastors' Emergency Association, he voiced what all 
of them felt: "We are in a state of confusion and harmlessness. We need clear directions to avoid 
turning in a dangerous direction" (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 101). Bonhoeffer who had 
come from Finkenwalde, where he led one of the first seminaries founded by the Confessional 
Church, was especially critical about the fact that the synod at Augsburg had not addressed the 
Aryan paragraph and other recent political decisions. The meeting ended with the writing of a 
letter to all pastors reminding them of the demands made in Barmen and Dahlem (W. Niemoller, 
Der Pfarrernotbund 1 02). 
The Reichsbruderrat (National Council of Brothers) of the Pastors' Emergency Association 
met in August discussing strategies to re-organize the church on both national and local levels. 
They hoped restructuring would bring order to the chaotic church landscape. The members ofthe 
Reichsbruderrat agreed that the Pastors' Emergency Association should become a brotherhood for 
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all pastors ofthe Confessional Church, which meant the latter needed to officially join the former. 
Many in the provisional church leadership considered the Pastors' Emergency Association too 
dangerous because of its association with Martin Niemoller; therefore, the suggestions of the 
Reichsbruderrat went untested (yv . Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 105-106). 
In October the church's landscape changed again. Two committees were established, one for 
the national level and one for the regional level of the Landeskirchen. The members affirmed 
National Socialistic ideas and did not address the declarations of Barmen and Dahlem. Moderate 
Christians expected these committees to solve the problems in the church and to bring order. 
Even some members of the Pastors' Emergency Association held such a conviction and withdrew 
their financial support from the organization--a financial support that was needed more than ever 
to help those pastors who had been suspended, fined or jailed for being a member of the Pastor's 
Emergency Associati<:n (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 106-1 07). 
The year 1936 began with squabbles centering on the new church commitees. Squabbling 
over doctrinal issues and threatened by old fears of regionalism, the Confessional Church began to 
fall apart (Shelley Baranowski, Betrayal 98) which became very obvious during the fourth synod 
of the German Evangelical Church hosted by the Confessional Church, which took place in Bad 
Oeynhausen in mid-February: Neither group attending was willing to come together and make a 
concerted effort to become a unified body. Each group insisted on "going about their business in 
their own way" (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 108), resulting in a fragmentation ofthe 
Confessional Church that robbed it of its strength. Eventually the tension within the Confessional 
Church would also reach the Pastors' Emergency Association and add to the burden the 
organization already carried (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 108). The Provisional Church 
Leadership, associated with the Confessional Church, obviously failed during this time completely, 
since Bethge points out that a second Provisional Church Leadership was established in February 
(E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133). 
Many Landeskirchen faced severe problems during 1936. Attempts to limit the rights of state 
bishops to the realm of "preaching and official duties" (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der 
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Bekennenden Kirche 352) failed. The regional committee in Nassau-Hessen, for example, had 
been established for the fourth time, and each time it was obvious that the members appointed 
were considered appropriate choices by the government rather by individual pastors. The 
Confessional Church in Pommem faced complete destruction by the regional committee~ the same 
was true for the churches in Silesia and Westphalia. During the Silesian synod in Naumburg which 
took place from July 1-4, participants argued over who had ultimate authority in the church. They 
agreed on the following which ended their declaration: "Only the church has the order to separate 
true and false doctrine. --Only the church is supposed to watch and decide about its organization 
and its offices. --Only the church has the authority to call appropriate church members to serve in 
those offices" (y/. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 3 57) . The Naumburg 
declaration followed the general outline of its predecessors ofBarmen and Dahlem; however, most 
of the German Christians and church members involved could not handle its implication and were 
. 
therefore very upset to be reminded that the problem of the German Protestant Church had not 
been solved yet (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 357) . 
By the end of April the Prussian Bn1derrat, associated with the Confessional Church, planned 
a "visitation program" lasting from May to June in order to strenghen the unity among individual 
churches in those provinces and regions that had the most problems. Each time two members of 
the Old Prussian Union conducted a visitation, they focused their attention on updating the local 
church members on the current status of the church struggle while gathering information on the 
condition of the local confessional churches. From the gathered information it became more and 
more obvious that the church committees had dealt the Confessional Church a crippling blow in all 
visited regions (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 360-362). 
The attempts to solve the problems within the Protestant churches lasted into the next year. 
An announcement on February 15, 1937, promising new church elections for later in the year 
caused the different factions within the Protestant Church to renew their ties, while "the 
Provisional Church Leadership [associated with the Confessional Church] and the Council of 
Germany's Protestant-Lutheran Church decided to join forces" and appointed members of both 
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groups to represent the newly formed group, called Leadership of the German Evangelical Church 
(W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 408-409). 
However, the joint efforts of cooperation among the different church groups did not last long, 
since the announced elections never took place. Obviously not everybody had been eager to 
cooperate. The chairmen of the national church committees and non-German-Christian bishops 
met at a conference without inviting either the Prussian Bruderrat or the Provisional Church 
Leadership which were both closely linked to the Confessional Church, and set up a new church 
government. The Prussian Bruderrat, speaking for the Confessional Church, denied the new 
church leadership any legitimacy. The church committees collapsed one after another, in early 
1937, as German Christians abandoned the committees like sinking ships when the news was 
published that the Prussian Bruderrat, associated with the Confessional Church, had made a deal 
with the government sponsored, regional church committee ofPrussia which gave the Prussian 
. 
Bruderrat a legal voice in Prussia's church affairs (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der 
Bekennenden Kirche 408-409). 
The fact that the non-German-Christian bishops agreed to set up a new church government 
shows how confusing and fragmented the entire Protestant church landscape was at that time. 
Neither group that vied for control or at least for their voice to be heard was able to gain a 
majority. Cooperative efforts crumbled as soon as they were made, and most of the new offices 
that were intended to improve church government failed miserably. 
It is interesting to note that it was the Prussian Bruderrat and not the national Bruderrat that 
made the deal with the Prussian church committee. The reason, according to Wilhelm Niemoller, 
was very simple. The national Bruderrat had fallen apart after one final stand on June 23 when the 
council met and decided to call on Protestant Christians not to attend the upcoming church 
elections. Eight members of the national Bruderrat were arrested by the secret police when the 
latter broke up the meeting (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 115). 
Despite the victory the Prussian Bruderrat gained through its deal with the government 
sponsored Prussian church committee, its members could not enjoy the fruits of their labor for 
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long. The police arrested Martin Niemoller on July 1, 193 7, thus dealing a crippling blow to the 
Bruderrat, the Pastors' Emergency Association, the Bruderrat of the Old Prussian Union and the 
Council of the German Protestant Church--groups which listed Niemoller as one of their members. 
While many raised their voices coming to Niemoller's defense, one voice remained silent, and 
nothing could induce the representatives of the Lutheran churches to raise their voice for 
Niemoller's case (yv. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 116-117). 
Five days after Niemoller was incarcerated in the Moabit prison in Berlin, a clerical committee 
was founded in Kassel. The different factions were the "conference of bishops, the Provisional 
Church Leadership of the Confessional Church as well as the churches of the states ofBavaria, 
Hanover, and Wiirtemberg, and the Council of Germany's Protestant-Lutheran Church" (yv. 
Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennend.en Kirche 409). Their decision to cooperate was a 
major breakthrough in the struggle to unite the Protestant church. Their message to the 
. 
churches in the whole country, written on August 20, spoke clearly of the disastrous situation of 
the church and cited all the government's attacks that made the pastors' job to proclaim the Gospel 
almost impossible. Despite its inflammatory content, the message was printed and distributed 
without alerting government officials. However, this lapse of reaction by the government could 
not cover up the fact that the Confessional Church was losing ground (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und 
Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 409). 
One of the heaviest losses the Confessional Church suffered during this time was the loss of 
Karl Immer who had a stroke in prison. Even though he recovered somewhat, his strength was 
minimal through the final few years of his life. Yet he remained influential and was hated by the 
government for one particular letter he wrote to his children (yv. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis 
der Bekennenden Kirche 413). According to Wilhelm Niemoller, "no other document of the 
Confessional Church was as sought after" as the 'sunbeam-letter' in which Immer "told his children 
about his experiences in prison" (yv . Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 
413). "Whoever was distantly involved with the copying and distribution of that letter was 
arrested, threatened, interrogated and put under pressure" (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der 
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The loss of leading men like Martin Niemoller and Karl bruner was not the only problem the 
Confessional Church dealt with in the summer of 1937. More problems became known 
soon enough at the Prussian Confessional Synod in Lippstadt where participants in late August 
heard a whole litany of government restrictions that affected the church negatively (W. Niemoller, 
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 409). In September Himmler announced 
that any pastor's training done at Confessional Church institutions was illegal (E. Bethge, 
Bonhoe.ffer 133), a decision that denied young trainees the opportunity to learn a Gospel untainted 
by German Christian theology. One of the results was that the police shut down the seminary in 
Finkenwalde, where Dietrich Bonhoeffer had been teaching for a little over two years. However, 
work continued in the underground until 1940, when it was discovered and shut down for a 
second time. By that time many of its students had already been conscripted. Many of them died 
. 
in the war and did not return (Renate Bethge, Wunderbar geborgen: Dietrich Bonhoeffer 24). 
Following the increased restrictions and persecution by the government, the Pastors' 
Emergency Association spent the rest of 193 7 restructuring the organization, especially since one 
of the main leaders, Martin Niemoller, remained in prison for the rest of the year. One of the 
major changes was the decision to stop managing the finances and funds of the organization from 
Berlin. When Niemoller had been arrested, the police confiscated not only his personal money but 
also money belonging to the organization. Since it was a considerable sum, the financial structure 
of the Pastors' Emergency Association was decentralized, giving authority to the provincial leaders 
(W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 119-124). 
The next major event in the history of the Pastors' Emergency Assocation, which also 
impacted the Confessional Church, began on February 7, 1938. Martin Niemoller's trial began and 
lasted for nineteen days. At the end he was punished with seven months in prison and several 
fines. Since he had already spent time in prison, the only thing to do for him was to pay the fines--
at least that was the court's verdict. In reality, Niemoller was taken to the concentration camp in 
Sachsenhausen by the Gestapo on March 2, where he was imprisoned until July 11 , 1941 when he 
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was sent to the concentration camp in Dachau, remaining there until the end of the war. 
While Martin Niemoller was removed permanently from the church struggle, the fight against 
the German Christians and the government's intrusion in church affairs continued. Pastors of the 
Confessional Church were not allowed to travel or speak publicly--prohibitions which made it hard 
for them to tend to the needs of their congregations (yl. Niemoller, Kampf und Bekenntnis der 
Bekennenden Kirche 419). 
At the occasion of the annexation of Austria, the Reichskirchenregierung (Reich church's 
government) presented Hitler with a very special birthday gift in April of 1938. Every pastor was 
ordered to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler. In the beginning many pastors of the Confessional 
Church refused, but later gave in since they argued that the government could request such an 
oath. Interestingly enough it was argued later that neither the NSDAP nor the government was 
really concerned about the pastors giving that oath. Dietrich Bonhoeffer had advocated against 
. 
the loyalty oath, yet his words had fallen on deaf ears (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70). 
As the summer passed and more and more pastors swore the loyalty oath, life for the Jews in 
Germany became even more difficult than it had been. In August they were ordered to have 
identification papers that marked them clearly as Jews, "an 'I'--Israel for men and an 'S'--Sarah for 
women" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70). This new law caused Bonhoeffer's twin sister and her Jewish 
husband to leave Germany immediately. While Dietrich Bonhoeffer helped his sister and her 
husband escape to England, Karl Barth surprised his friends among the Confessional Church with 
a letter he wrote to "JosefHromadka, a theologian in Prague, Tschecheslowakia, calling for armed 
resistance against Hitler's forces" (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 70). The Provisional Church 
Leadership, as well as other leading members of the Confessional Church, decided that they had to 
distance themselves from Barth in order to protect themselves and their organizations (E. Bethge, 
Bonhoeffer 70). On September 27, the Provisional Church Leadership ordered a special prayer 
church service in which the church asked for prayer that war might be avoided (E. Bethge, 
Bonhoejjer 70). The media saw the church service in a different light arguing that participants had 
used the event to fan the flames of disharmony and disunity among the German people (yl. 
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Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 448). 
In November "Jewish stores were looted, synagogues were burnt to the ground and almost the 
entire male Jewish population was sent to concentration camps" (y.l. Niemoller, Kampf und 
Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 457) after a young Jew killed a member of the German 
ambassador's party in Paris. The persecution of Jews and Jewish Christians in Germany who were 
blamed for the incident, increased to unprecedented heights (y.l. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis 
der Bekennenden Kirche 457). About 26,000 Jewish youth were sent to concentrations camps in 
Buchenwald, Dachau and Sachsenhausen. They would not be set free unless they declared 
themselves willing to leave Germany. Furthermore, the Jewish population was ordered to pay a 
lump sum of a billion Reichsmark as reparations. Jews' participation in public life was restricted 
and limited in such a manner that it was impossible for them to live a normal life. By late January 
1939, Goring would ~rder the Jews to be either evacuated or forced to leave the country 
(Reichskristallnacht 1 ). Eberhard Bethge argued that the Confessional Church ceased to be 
publicly effective after November 9, 1938 (Bonhoeffer 70), an assessment that seemed to be 
confirmed by later accounts of Wilhelm Niemoller even though Dietrich Bonhoetfer in particular 
had continually tried to remind the members of the Confessional Church of their responsibility 
toward their Jewish friends. 
The Confessional Church was hit hard during this time. Four members of the Provisional 
Church Leadership faced disciplinary hearings. The Prussian Council of Brothers missed the 
incarcerated Martin Niemoller's insight and the help ofKarl Lucking who was in exile. As a result 
of the Reichskristallnacht, 97 members of the Confessional Church were hindered in the execution 
oftheir duties, 11 members were prohibited from leaving the country, 39 members were prohibited 
from visiting certain cities, 40 members were prohibited from speaking publicly, 48 members were 
forced to leave their offices, and finally 2 members were expelled (y.l. Niemoller, A us dem Leben 
eines Bekenntnispfarrers 240). 
Despite these obstacles, the Confessional Church responded to these new outbursts of 
violence and aggression during their meeting on December 10-12. Participants were called to 
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follow the directions of scripture and to remember that Jewish Christians were their brothers and 
sisters. Participants were also reminded that the Gospel was given to all people, including the 
Jews and that therefore the church should not tum its back to the Jews in their time of need. One 
result was that the Bruderrat of the Old Prussian Union, associated with the Confessional Church, 
sent a message to all congregations with the request to pray faithfully for the Jewish Christians. 
Many pastors who called their congregations back under the word of God and who dared to 
critize the atrocities committed against the Jews became targets of hostilities themselves. They 
were attacked and beaten, arrested and sent to regular prisons as well as to concentration camps 
(W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 458-463). 
THE GERMAN AND CONFESSIONAL CHURCHES IN 1939-1945 
The Confessional Church held a synod on January 28, 1939 in Nikolasee, where pastors 
. 
"declared solidarity" with those pastors who had been trained by the Confessional Church. Since 
Himmler had shut down their seminaries in the Fall of 1938, those trainees were considered to be 
"illegals," especially if they actively served as pastors (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133, W. Niemoller, 
Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 441 ). 
While some information is still available on the Confessional Church during this time, little has 
survived about the activities of the Pastors' Emergency Association. According to Wilhelm 
Niemoller, the organization increasingly spent money to help pastors with their living 
expenses and legal assistance. Most of the tasks of the Pastors' Emergency Association were by 
that time laid on Hermine Hermes, the organization's secretary and Dr. Wilhelm Jannasch, 
the manager. Many of his colleagues, who had helped run the organization, had been conscripted 
into the army by that time (W. Niemoller, Der Pfarrernotbund 142). 
In early February the Protestant Church in Thtiringen, Eastern Germany, which was composed 
of very radical German Christians, released new regulations that basically applied the Aryan 
paragraph to the environment of the church and Jews were completely ostracized from church life. 
In late February three more Protestant churches applied similar regulations in their regions. Even 
Klarhorst 3 5 
though the Confessional Church, according to Wilhelm Niemoller, tried to address the issue of the 
Aryan-paragraph in the church, it never really made much of an impact. One of the last few times 
that the church addressed this issue was when members of an organization called 
Nationalkirchliche Einigung Deutsche Christen (National Church Unification German Christians) 
which had formed a loose cooperation with other Protestant pastors, but not with the Confessional 
Church, published the Godesberg Declaration in which it affirmed that Christianity and Judaism 
were mutually exclusive. On April 4, 1939, eleven regional church leaders (Landeskirchenleiter) 
agreed with the the Godesberg Declaration. Furthermore, they agreed to study how to remove 
Jewish influences from churchlife and establish a church organization that would fight the 
politizing of religion. The Prussian Council ofBrothers, associated closely with the Confessional 
Church, ordered their response to the Godesberg Declaration to be read in the churches, accusing 
especially the Thuringian German Christians for radically forcing Confessional Churches to yield 
. 
to the new theology. The regional councils of brothers (Landesbruderriite) pointed out in their 
declaration that God himself had appointed Israel as his chosen people. Nothing anybody else 
decided could change that, not even the Jews themselves, no matter how much they had refused in 
their history to be God's people (W. Niemoller, Kampf und Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 457-
471). 
Declarations like those above had almost no impact. In the same month the Protestant church 
leadership in Prussia, associated with the German Christians, decided that every pastor in their 
employ had to prove his Aryan heritage. If pastors could not do that, they were dismissed from 
their duties. But not only non-Aryan pastors, whether Protestant or Confessional, faced hardships 
during these days. In late March, Dr. Werner, President of the Protestant Church Council ofthe 
old Prussian Union, though associated with the Confessional Church, decreed that the 
appointment of a pastor was merely an administrative act. Congregations had neither rights 
anymore to refuse a pastor assigned to them based on his beliefs or lifestyle, nor could pastors 
refuse to serve a congregation they had been assigned to (W. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der 
Bekennenden Kirche 460, 467). 
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Pastors were not only burdened with restrictions, they were also actively hunted down. 
Friedrich "Fritz" Muller, pastor in Dahlem, was officially convicted in March of 1939 of major 
violations of conduct and suspended. One of the things that Muller was lacking, according to 
accusations, was a proper attitude toward the war. In the written decision, the judges stated that 
Muller's liturgies lacked for example "the request for victory in battle." Furthermore, the judges 
argued that the focus on Old Testament theology with an emphasis of God punishing people with 
war was inappropriate (y/. Niemoller, Kampfund Zeugnis der Bekennenden Kirche 451-452). 
Muller continued to fight for the needs of the Confessional Church despite his suspension and the 
fact that he was no longer allowed to preach. He died of a heart attack in September 1942 while 
serving as a soldier near Leningrad (y/. Niemoller, Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 80). 
Meanwhile the German troops continued their attacks. They invaded Prague in mid-March 
and Poland in early September after the German government had reached an agreement with 
. 
Russia. England declared war on Germany on September 3. Whether members of the 
Confessional Church were still as eager to serve in the military as they were back in 193 5 when 
Hitler issued a new conscription law might be questionable. However, since their patriotism had 
been doubted severely in the past, it was quite possible that many went to war without second 
thoughts (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 60-61, 133). Many of them would not return to their families, 
but die in battle, effectively weakening the Confessional Church which not only lost members that 
way, but also lost the grip on the churches those pastors had served--another very probable reason 
why the Confessional Church became more and more a silent church. 
Not every pastor died in the war. Wilhelm Niemoller, who was conscripted in late 
August of 1939, survived the war and returned to his home church in Bielefeld six years later. 
During his time in the military, he was able to minister to his fellow soldiers, but he could not 
easily speak officially for the Confessional Church. He was banned from the pulpit in May of 
1939. This ban was very hard not only for his home church, but also for his brother's church in 
Dahlem, Berlin, where he had filled in as occasional pastor ever since Martin Niemoller had been 
arrested and imprisoned (y/. Niemoller, A us dem Leben eines Bekenntnispfarrers 248-273). 
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The war that began in 1939 continued to gain momentum in 1940 with the invasion of 
Denmark and Norway in April and the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and 
France in May. During all this time, the Confessional Church surely tried to be active and 
effective, but according to Eberhard Bethge and Wilhelm Niemoller only silence came from the 
Confessional Church during this time. 
Occasionally the Confessional Church tried to break the silence, but was not very successful. 
In October 1940 the ninth Prussian confessional synod met in Leipzig addressing especially the 
issue of euthanasia without any major resolutions. Everyone seemed to have his own approach. 
Pastor v. Bodelschwingh continually tried to protect his patients in the mental institutions in 
Bethel near Bielefeld. Others chose a more direct approach. In a meeting in Hamm, Pastor Ernst 
Wilm called for active protection and care for the mentally ill. He was arrested in 1942 and sent to 
the concentration camp in Dachau. Unfortunately, on the whole, the Confessional Church was 
. 
painfully silent when it came to the issue of euthanasia (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im 
Kampj 54-55). 
In May of 1941, twenty-three comittee members of the Confessional Church were arrested 
and tried in December. In the same month bishop Wunn called for a unification of all Protestant 
pastors. The final attempt of the Confessional Church occurred on October 16, 1943, in Breslau. 
The main focus was the Fifth Commandment, cited to protest against the murder ofnon-Aryans 
and those people deemed invaluable for society (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 133-135). 
Undoubtedly, members of the Confessional Church continued in their own limited ways to 
make a difference where they served during those last years of the war. But a united front and 
workable cooperation between different groups was unfortunately no longer possible. 
Wilhelm Niemoller describes the toll the war took on the Confessional Church in the province 
of Westphalia alone. "Fifty pastors, 68 lay pastors, 26 candidates for the pastorate, and 15 
theology students died in the line of duty. Sixteen pastors, 18 lay pastors, and one candidate for 
the pastorate were missing" (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im Kampj 52). The mortal loss 
of pastors leaft big gaps in the care of the congregations and hindered the effectiveness 
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of the Confessional Church. "The frequent air raids and bombings that ruined many churches, the 
loss of church bells and the loss of a real voice in the press all aided in the weakening and 
consequent demise of the Confessional Church" (W. Niemoller, Westfalische Kirche im Kampf 
52). Lutzer points out in his book, Hitler's Cross, that "Hitler always used a man's family as an 
inducement for absolute obedience" (182). Many pastors who would have liked to be more 
outspoken and more radical felt they had to practice restraint for the sake of their families. 
(Lutzer, Hitler's Cross 182) Despite afflictions and fear, the pastors and members ofthe 
Confessional Church tried to do their best in those places where they were. The ways the men 
served differed greatly. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer became involved in a conspiracy against Hitler because of the close 
connections with his brother-in-law Hans v. Dohnanyi. Bonhoeffer had an opportunity to escape 
the war unharmed when he went to New York in June of 1939~ yet, his conscience forced him to 
. 
return to Germany after just one month. From then on his involvement in the conspiracy grew 
consistantly. When the Gestapo made his life miserable again with prohibitions against speaking, 
and required that he show up at the local police station in regular intervals, his brother-in-law 
arranged his transfer to Munich with the help of another conspirator, Hans Oster, a colonel in the 
military defense department. Even during this time, Bonhoeffer never severed his ties with the 
Confessional Church, but his views were frowned upon by many. Ultimately, the conspiracy was 
discovered. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans v. Dohnanyi and their wives were arrested on April 5, 
1943. The women were soon released, but the men stayed in prison and were joined in October 
by Bonhoeffer's brother, Klaus, and their friends, RUdiger Schleicher and Eberhard Bethge, who 
had tried to help Bonhoeffer and Dohnanyi to break out of prison. On April 9, 1945, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and other conspirators, including Hans Oster, were hung in the concentration camp of 
FlossenbUrg. Hans von Dohnanyi was very likely killed on the same day in the concentration camp 
of Sachsenhausen. Klaus Bonhoeffer and RUdiger Schleicher were killed by an SS commando on 
April23, 1945 (E. Bethge, Bonhoeffer 88-100, 132-134). 
Another valuable member of the Confessional Church, Karl Immer, the author of the 
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"sunbeam" writings who had fought side-by-side with Martin Niemoller, was responsible during 
the church war for spreading the word of the Confessional Church by whatever means possible. 
His resourcefulness to get the decisions of the numerous synods printed and passed out had 
fiutstrated his opponents. He was arrested in AugustS, 1937, and imprisoned in Berlin. A stroke 
which he suffered six days later left him physically severely impaired. Despite his physical frailty, 
he continued to serve the Confessional Church for seven more years until he died in May 1944 (W. 
Niemoller, Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 69-73 ). 
A close friend of Karl Immer was Paul Humburg who served as official leader of the 
Confessional Church in the Rhineland and then later served as a member of the provisional church 
government. One of his ministries was to young theology students. His responsibilites included 
the preparations of their examination according to the beliefs of the Confessional Church. His 
activites attracted the attention of the Gestapo. Repeated arrests and interrogation weakened him 
. 
and he was forced to resign from all his offices. Suffering from increasing blindness and the loss 
of a leg, he died in May 1945 and was buried by the side ofhis friend, Karl Immer (W. Niemoller, 
Lebensbilder aus der Bekennenden Kirche 54-62). 
Once the war was lost, remnants of the Confessional Church issued a declaration at Stuttgart 
on October 19, 1945, accepting part of the guilt ofwhat had happened in Germany. The 
Westphalian Church issued the same type of statement for their province on July 20, 1946. 
We confess that we as members of the church have sinned against God. The Lord of the 
church had given us in the church struggle clear insights during the confessional synods. 
We have often acted against those insights and withdrawn from them. We loved our own 
security more than we loved our Lord, Jesus Christ. We were all too gullible in the 
beginning and did not see through the national socialism that made the nation (Volk) into 
an idol. We did not speak up loud enough aginst the annihilation of the Jews and other 
condemned people. We resisted less and less against the totalitarian influence so that our 
view of the living Lord dimmed. We were confused in arrogance, cowardly in love, and 
weak in faith . We hoped for help from people, instead of help from God: 
We reject to speak of other people's guilt without confessing our own. 
We admonish our brothers and sisters to examine themselves before God for any guilt 
of their own. (W. Niemoller, Westphiilische Kirche im Kampj 58-59) 
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CONCLUSION 
Considering the remarks of the Westphalian Church, it becomes obvious that the Confessional 
Church did not die after all, but was forced into silence instead. Despite the fact that the church 
condemned itself for having been silent and ineffective, it cannot be denied that men like Martin 
Niemoller, Fritz Miiller-Dahlem, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and all the others who are less known today 
gave their best efforts to restore the Protestant church to a purer, more Christ-centered institution. 
A great deception, testing and sifting took place in the German Church during the Third 
Reich. Hitler was very careful at first to hide his real intentions. His early speeches revealed 
nothing but willingness to cooperate with the churches. His true beliefs about Christianity were 
revealed slowly in the steps he took quietly to irradicate religion from the life of the German 
people beginning with the youth by drawing them to Hitler Jugend meetings rather than to church, 
and forbidding religio~ to be taught in school. This is one reason why the German Christians 
bought into Hitler's agenda. They hoped for a united German church. Since they could not 
acheive their goals themselves they relied on the help from the Nazis, who were only too happy to 
lend assistance, knowing full well that as soon as the church was fragmented into different 
factions, it would no longer pose a threat to the Nazi's cause. 
Christians were tested and the chaff was separated from the wheat. Every Christian had 
eventually to ask where he/she stood regarding a personal faith in Jesus Christ. Was it the Christ 
of the Bible or the Fuhrer of the German nation? Pastors and church leaders, who were naturally 
more in the spotlight than the average citizen, had to face particular difficulties. They faced 
increasing difficulties in taking care of their congregations, including limited resources, restrictions 
preaching, intimidation, interrogations, prison and suspension. The ability to communicate with 
like-minded colleagues for encouragement and support was restricted as well, leading to a sense of 
isolation and weariness. But despite these hardships they tried to preach a pure Gospel. 
One question that arises is whether there would have been a rethinking, refocusing on Christ 
as the center of theology among pastors and churches without something as aggravating as Hitler's 
national socialism. A second question is what would have happened if men like Niemoller, Muller-
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Dahlem, and Bonhoeffer had been less ractical. As shown in the paper, it was the Dahlemites, the 
men around Niemoller and MtilJer-Dahlem, who constantly reminded the Protestant and 
Confessional Churches of the declaration ofBarmen. A refocusing took place whenever these 
men sensed that the church was turning in the wrong direction or weakened in its efforts. 
Bonhoeffer died for his beliefs, beliefs he hammered out during his short life. The impact of his 
martyrdom cannot be underestimated for the generations of Christians in Germany that followed. 
Gehard Leipholz once wrote about Dietrich Bonhoeffer, his brother-in.-law: "He has set a model 
for a new type of true leadership inspired by the gospel, daily ready for martyrdom and death and 
imbued by a new sprit ofChristain humanism and a creative sense of civic duty" (Bonhoeffer, The 
Cost of Discipleship, ''Memoirs" 33). Bonhoeffer practiced what he believed, that "he who 
believes is obedient [ ... and] that only he who is obedient believes" (Bonhoeffer, The Cost of 
Discipleship 64) and set an example for every Christian to contemplate . 
. 
By no means is this to be understood as a condemnation ofthose men who felt a need to 
protect their families. Undoubtedly such a decision caused many of them much grief and pain, but 
not everybody was and is cut out to be a martyr. And fear was ever present for all people not just 
pastors, but alJ people. One lady, who witnessed the horrors of the war as a child, shared this little 
story during an inpromptu interview: Her father had been employed in the printshop of Pastor v. 
Bodelschwingh, the former Reichsbishop, in Bethel near Bielefeld. As laws regarding printed 
material tightened, there was less and less to print, and also greater fear of possessing prohibited 
material, especialJy from the Confessional Church. This lady witnessed that an old man, in his late 
seventies or early eighties, who lived in the same house, was picked up by the Gestapo for 
interrogation and his place searched for prohibited material from the Confessional Church. Her 
last comment on the incident was this, "But, of course, you understand, everybody was afraid. 
You did not talk about it, that was too dangerous. It could get you killed to talk about that" 
(Klarhorst, Heidi interview). 
Martin Niemoller survived prison and concentration camps, but he paid nonetheless a heavy 
price for his engagement in the church struggle. He was called an enemy of the German people 
Klarhorst 42 
which bothered him after having been a World War I veteran (Martin Niemoller, Briefe aus der 
Gefangenschaft Moabi/39). While in Sachsenhausen, he spent four years in solitary confinement 
as '"prisoner of the Fuhrer,"' from which he would be released only to be moved to a concentration 
camp in Dachau, where he was held until the war was over (Martin Niemoller, Briefe aus der 
Gejangenschaft: Konzentrationslager Sachsenhausen 8). Martin Niemoller is intimately linked 
with the church struggle and many have heard at least his name, but he is only representative of 
thousands who tried to make a difference and bring the people back to a Christ-centered theology. 
One issue where guilt is less pardonable is the fact that many members of the Confessional 
Church held no strong convictions against the Aryan-paragraph. In this regard they carried 
considerable guilt which cannot be blotted out by the fact that many tried to help the Jews once it 
became apparent that the National Socialists indeed planned to annihilate the Jews. And yet who 
else but the church st?od in the way of the Nazis except a few brave individuals like the Scholl 
siblings, if not the Confessional Church? 
In conclusion, it can be said that considering the odds Niemoller, Bonhoeffer and the others 
faced, they gave their best efforts to proclaim Jesus Christ as Lord. Once they understood the 
implications of the new religion and the idea that Hitler was supposed to be the new savior of the 
German people, they tried everything they could to help the church refocus on Christ. The 
Confessional Church, despite its shortcomings and limitations, did valuable work drawing the 
German people back to Christ, foiling the attempts of the National Socialists and making it 
difficult for the Nazis and the German Christians to paganize the churches. 
Church Struggle-
Confessional 
Church 
Deutsche 
Christen 
Landeskirchen -
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Protestant 
Church 
Reichsbishop 
Reichsbruderrat-
Vorkiufige 
Provisorische 
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Definitions ofT erms 
the conflict among the different factions within the Protestant Church 
regarding organization, leadership, and church politics (especially the 
influence of government in the church) 
church that resisted the paganization and intrusion of the Protestant Church 
by the Nazis and the German Christians; main supporters: Martin Niemoller, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Immer, Hans Asmussen, and Karl Barth 
German Christians, supported the Nazi's agenda for the Protestant Church 
regional churches that have a central clerial government in a state 
Pastors' Emergency Association, an organization founded by Martin 
Niemoller to connect and assist pastors in their duties, anti-nazi and anti-
German Christians 
main religious group in Germany that is often also refered to as Lutheran, and 
Evangelical, which however differs from what Americans think of when they 
hear those terms 
highest of all German bishops and head of the Protestant Church 
Council ofBrothers on national level, included members of the Confessional 
Church as well as other groups, but no German Christians 
Provisional Church Leadership, a form of government that included members 
of various Protestant groups, but no German Christians; a weak organization 
that tended toward moderation and was weary of the Pastors' Emergency 
Association 
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